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aBstract
Many analytic philosophers of mind take for granted a certain (broadly 
Humean) conception of causality. Assumptions deriving from that concep-
tion are in place when they problematize what they call mental causation 
or argue for physicalism in respect of the mental. I claim that a different 
(broadly Aristotelian) conception of causality is needed for understanding 
many ordinary causal truths about things which act, including truths about 
human, minded beings — sc. rational beings who lead lives.
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1. Introduction
When “a problem of mental causation” has been discussed, various assump-
tions have been in place. They are assumptions which pervade the philosophy 
of mind of the last fifty years; but there is recent philosophical work on causal-
ity which puts them into question. In what follows, I take sides with the recent 
work, and challenge the conception of causality that many philosophers of 
mind have come to take for granted.
I start with something about how “mental causation” has come to be un-
derstood when it is taken to be a suitable case for problematization or to supply 
a premise in an argument for physicalism in respect of the mental (§2). I then 
bring the recent work to bear: I argue that the properly causal aspect of agency 
is not accounted for using a relation “cause” obtaining between pairs of items 
(§3). The argument puts me in a position to dislodge a certain style of account 
of human agency, which is something I attempt to do (in §4) before concluding.
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2. “Psychophysical Interaction”
On 10th June 1643, Princess Elisabeth, in a letter to Descartes, said that «it 
would be easier for [her] to concede matter and extension to the soul than to 
concede the capacity to move a body and to be moved by it to an immaterial 
thing» (trans. Shapiro, 2007). Elisabeth’s thought has come to be put by say-
ing that Descartes’s belief in the metaphysical distinctness of souls and bodies 
ensured that he could not admit causal interaction between them. More than 
three centuries on, an idea of causal interaction is used in an argument for a 
kind of physicalism. Donald Davidson propounded a Principle of Causal In-
teraction which says that «at least some mental events interact causally with 
physical events» (1970). This was in an essay which some will see as setting off 
a problem of mental causation.
Davidson’s Principle can apparently be endorsed by someone who has no 
truck with the idea of minds as immaterial things that might move bodies. For 
Davidson distinguished events of two different kinds, not substances of two dif-
ferent kinds as Descartes did. Still, as any student of philosophy of mind knows, 
Davidson’s Principle combines with other claims to launch a new problematic. 
These other claims are rested in a conception of the physical causal world and 
its workings which may be rather different from Davidson’s own; but, like Da-
vidson’s, is thought to be conducive to physicalism in respect of the mind. If the 
physicalism reached is of a non-reductive sort (as with Davidson and others), 
then some will say that the mental in that case must be epiphenomenal; and if the 
physicalism reached is of a reductive sort (as with e.g. Papineau and others), then 
some will say that the mental in that case might as well be deemed eliminable. 
Either way, the conclusion that might be reached is unpalatable.
Of course there are some who still side with Descartes, and there are many 
who defend physicalism, whether non-reductive or reductive, taking their ver-
sion of it to be free of any troublesome consequences. But believing that there 
is a trouble-free view of the place of human beings in the natural causal world, 
which is not a physicalist one, I think that one does well to ask what mental/
physical interaction might be supposed to be. Exactly what claim or principle 
is it that, being combined with claims about the physical world, has generated 
a great debate? It may strike one as indubitable that there is “psychophysical 
interaction”. But how is “interaction” understood when it strikes one so? What 
does “physical” mean? What are they which are supposed to “interact”?
Suppose that a boulder has flattened a barn. Is there here an example of physi-
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cal/physical interaction? Yes, presumably. What understanding of “physical” is 
brought to bear in treating it as such? An ordinary one, presumably, according to 
which boulders and barns are both of them physical. Well, this appears not to be 
the understanding of “physical” of those who adduce claims about the physical 
causal world in their arguments in philosophy of mind. In those arguments we 
are told, for instance, that «all physical effects are fully determined by law and 
a purely physical prior history»; and when physicalism is endorsed, the “ism” is 
often said to relate to «current physics or a future development of it». 
I have placed the word “physical” in small capitals here. I intend to signal the 
difference between different understandings of the word; and I shall write “physi-
cal” wherever I take it that it would be supposed to be understood by allusion to 
science. I acknowledge that proponents of physicalism are likely to say that there 
is a single sense of “physical”, true both of macroscopic things such as boulders 
and barns, and also of whatever belongs in the domain of the science of physics 
(atoms?, fermions?, quarks?1). These physicalists rely on the idea of an extraor-
dinarily compendious domain containing everything physical in some putative, 
suitably encompassing sense. I suspect that the idea of such a domain has some 
appeal if one imagines the world frozen in time: thinking of the boulder just at 
an instant, one might think that it could be identified with the collection of those 
particles which might be supposed to be parts of it exactly then. But if it is al-
lowed that causality is a feature of a changing world, in which some things persist 
through change, others not, then it must also be allowed there are entities that are 
no part of a universe that might as well be static. When the conception of causal-
ity which physicalists bring to bear is enforced, there appears to be no room for 
genuinely continuant objects which exist for a time, which may survive changes in 
their parts, and which (like the barn) may be destroyed.2
1  Higgs Boson particles?? I don’t think I know how proponents of physicalism conceive the domain of 
science of physics (“or a future development of it”). Some want biology to be reckoned a physical science 
for the purposes of their arguments. In the next section, I shall introduce considerations which suggest 
that causal notions having application in biology are not all of them governed by such principles as are sup-
posed to govern everything brought under the head of the physical.
2 Here I mean to put directly into question an assumption made by many physicalists and explicitly intro-
duced by Kim — that all macroscopic things (whether continuants or events) relate to microscopic things 
as wholes to parts. (For more detailed argument against such an assumption, taking the case of events, see 
Hornsby, 1985). Still there are physicalists who are happy to deny part-whole physicalisM, but say that 
what they call “levels physicalisM” is still sustainable (Hüttemann and Papineau, 2005). Myself I think 
that recognition of the ontology presupposed to ordinary causal truths creates an obstacle to arguments 
for levels physicalisM as much as to part-whole physicalisM. The levels physicalist says that «any putatively 
non-physical entity is identical to, or at least metaphysically supervenient on, physical entities». Well, I 
think that the supervenience thesis that would be needed if Papineau’s views about causation in his 2013 
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So much for the boulder and the barn. Suppose now that some person has 
flattened some dough, this being something that she meant to do. Is this now an 
example of mental/physical interaction? If the answer is Yes, then, granting that 
the boulder and its action on the barn that it flattened are physical in some good 
sense, we may now be supposed to think that the person who flattened the dough, 
or perhaps her action on the dough she flattened, was mental. This, however, will 
not seem right to anyone who is inclined to allow that people are physical in what-
ever sense it had seemed that boulders are. Some may say that the person’s body 
or some part of it, rather than the person, is what acted on the dough that she 
flattened, and that mental/physical interaction gets onto the scene only when one 
considers how it came to be that she flattened the dough. Well, I shall come to this 
in §4. For the time being I note that it can be a real question whether there has 
been mental causation by virtue of a person’s having flattened some dough — or, 
as it might be, cooked a meal, or wrapped a parcel, or hailed a taxi, or done any-
thing else that some human being may have done meaning so to do.
What now about interaction? Interaction would seem to be a two-way mat-
ter. Certainly it was causality in both directions as it were which concerned 
Princess Elisabeth,3 and which Davidson had in mind when he framed his 
Principle and brought perception, as well as action, in its scope. Likewise Jae-
gwon Kim, who has probably written as much as anyone else under the head of 
mental causation, has taken mental causation to be found wherever there are 
«causal relations involving mental events» (1996, p. 125). Kim once argued 
that it follows from a principle of physical causal closure that «if you pick any 
physical event and trace out its causal ancestry or posterity, that will never 
take you outside the physical domain». Kim then thought that someone who 
endorsed mental/physical interaction but resisted the closure principle was 
committed to «a radical diversity in the domain of events …, quite on a par 
with Descartes’s belief in two radically diverse domains of substances» (1998, 
p. 40). Subsequently, however, Kim, although he has continued to investigate 
putative physicalist implications both of human action and of human percep-
tion, has wanted to treat the two of them separately, taking there to be specific 
were to gain any argumentative purchase, would speak to a domain from which continuants would perforce 
be absent. My reasons for thinking this show up in §4.
3  Elisabeth in the first instance asked «how the soul of man …can determine the bodily spirits to perform 
voluntary actions», and she is often taken to have been concerned specifically with “mental→physical cau-
sation”. But Elisabeth also doubted whether Descartes could allow for “physical→mental causation”, as 
the quotation from her at the start of §2 above attests.
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problems about the conscious sensory events involved (as he thinks) in per-
ception (2010). Most writers on mental causation of the last thirty years follow 
the more recent Kim and concern themselves exclusively with the influence of 
a person’s mental life on what happens outside her (action), rather than with 
the difference that her sensory experience of things outside her makes to her 
mental life (perception). The concern just with action is a consequence of the 
fact that the physicalist principles don’t speak to putative mental effects but 
do demand a physical cause for any effect that may be thought of as physical.4 
Well, it may be clear already that I think that the physicalist principles don’t 
have very much to do with ourselves. But in what follows, I shall, like the prob-
lematizers and the physicalists, confine attention to what we are supposed to 
think of as causation by the mental.5
Meanwhile I note how curious can seem the supposition that uni-direction-
al relations, in whichever direction, between “mental” and “physical” could be 
extracted from what one might naturally think of as “psychophysical interac-
tion”. “Interaction” suggests a sort of simultaneous to-and-fro, so that psycho-
physical interactions might be thought to be exemplified when a person moves 
about the place aware of what she sees or hears as she does so. She might be 
thought of as caught up in the world which impinges upon her and upon which 
she simultaneously impinges. It then isn’t plausible that what is going on with 
her could be factored into events of two sorts about which one might wonder 
whether or not they should be reckoned “radically diverse”.
3. Agency and Powers
In recent years, there has been a rise in neo-Aristotelian, anti-Humean ap-
proaches to causation. The initial anti-Humean thought may be that the very 
various phenomena which attract the label “causation” cannot all be brought 
4  Patterson (2005) shows that principles such as those of physical Sufficiency and Causal Exclusion are 
needed to generate the 20th century problem of mental causation but played no role in the problem that 
Elisabeth found in Descartes.
5  Matson (1966) and King (2007), who show that a certain way of problematizing the mind is distinc-
tively modern, are worth citing in the context of the present paper, which attempts to draw on bits of 
neo-Aristotelianism as an antidote to problematization. In the context of the present paragraph, where I 
suggest that putative mental→physical causation (rather than physical→mental causation) has been at is-
sue in the debate about “mental causation”, it is worth noting that both Matson (on ancient philosophers) 
and King (on medievals) take it for granted that if the ancients or medievals had faced a problem, then 
it would have to have been in respect of what Kim calls conscious sensory events, i.e. a problem about 
perception, rather than action.
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under the head of “cause” if this is understood as a relation between events. 
More specifically, the suggestion may be that a different understanding is re-
quired in order that agency — a phenomenon in which something acts — should 
be recognized as the causal phenomenon it is.
Many verbs apparently introduce descriptions of causal goings on. There is 
a range of rather general verbs which one might think any treatment of causality 
would need to take into account— verbs such as “influence”, “produce”, “deter-
mine”, “control”. And there are the so-called verbs of action of which I’ve already 
introduced examples — “flatten”, “cook”, “wrap” “hail” — , to which might be 
added (as we shall see) “push”, “pull”, “lift”. It seems that when these verbs have 
application, so that something is said to be acting, or to have acted, on some-
thing, their subjects and objects for the most part do not pick out events. (To 
this it makes no difference whether events are taken to be concrete individual 
particulars [as with Davidson] or to be instantiations of properties by individu-
als at a time or throughout an interval of time [as with Kim]). Still, if Humeanism 
about causation is supposed to derive from Hume, then it doesn’t matter to a 
Humean that these apparently causal verbs should sometimes have substances 
as their subjects and objects. When Hume spoke of the relata of “cause” as ob-
jects, he did not mean “objects” to apply to events exclusively. Hume said «The 
idea of causation must be derived from some relation among objects» ([1740], I, 
iii; [1978], p. 75), and he meant substances, as much as events, to be covered.
Consider then how Hume’s claim plays out when it is allowed that causal 
verbs betoken some sort of causality, and that the relata of causation may be 
substances or events. Here is what might be said, by someone apparently taking 
Hume’s side.
The relations of pushing, pulling, lifting …might naturally be considered 
modes of causation: they are specific ways of causing something else to hap-
pen. There also seems to be a more general relation which these relations 
exemplify – causation itself. (Siegel, 2009, p. 520)
This can’t be quite right.6 Certainly relations may be expressed in sentences contain-
ing verbs such as ‘push’ and ‘pull’ and ‘lift’. For if A is pushing X, then A and 
6 Siegel was concerned with our experience of, not with the nature of, causation. And I’m happy with the 
conclusion of her paper when she formulates it in the words “Causation is represented in visual experi-
ence” (although I’d prefer to say that causality is represented, thinking that, when the word “causation” is 
used, an assumption that a relation is named is apt to creep in).
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X now stand to one another in the relation in which two things stand if one is 
now pushing the other; and if A lifted X, then A and X stand to one another in 
the relation in which two things stand if at some past time one lifted the other. 
But A is not causing a cart if A is pushing a cart; nor has A caused the book if 
A lifted the book. These verbs evidently do not express a relation of causation 
between two substances. Perhaps they will be said to express a relation between 
a substance and something of a different “happening” kind, as Siegel suggests. 
So what might be the “something else” that A was “causing to happen” if A was 
pushing a cart? Not the cart’s being pushed. For the cart’s being pushed was the 
cart’s being pushed by A, which was A’s pushing the cart, not something else. It 
is true that once A has stopped pushing the cart there can be said to be an event 
in Davidson’s sense — A’s pushing of the cart.7 But this event is not something 
that A caused: A, who could push the cart, had no need to cause her pushing of 
it. Speaking generally, it appears that whatever A may have done, if A’s having 
done it were a matter of A’s having produced an effect, then the existence of that 
effect could be explained by A’s having caused it. But in that case, it cannot be 
that A stands to the effect in a relation of causation: a relation can obtain at a 
time only if its two relata then exist; and that which A has caused does not exist 
before it has been caused (by A). Pushing, pulling, lifting can be considered 
modes of causing, then, just as Siegel suggests. But they cannot be thought to 
exemplify the relation of causation.
Neo-Aristotelians do not treat cause as everywhere a relation — neither 
as a relation between two events, nor between two objects, nor between an 
object and an event. Neo-Aristotelians find fault with the empiricists’ treat-
ment of dispositional properties as analyzable away in favour of counterfactual 
conditionals witch introduce relations between events.8 They take an object’s 
7 If A’s pushing of the cart is something there is by virtue of A’s having completed some particular push-
ing of the cart, then I assume it is an event in Davidson’s sense — an unrepeatable particular. Whether it 
is an event in Kim’s sense is less clear. But presumably Kim would say that there were times, say t1 and t2, 
at which A respectively started and stopped pushing the cart, and that there was an exemplification of 
pushing a cart by A throughout the interval from t1 to t2. I’m unclear how that exemplification of a property 
might be supposed to be related to the putative exemplifications of pushing a cart at t1 and at t2 and at any 
of the times intermediate between t1 and t2.
8 See, e.g. Lowe (2011): he provides a diagnosis of contemporary philosophers’ reluctance to admit such 
notions as powers. (Terminological note: some philosophers’ understanding of “disposition” seems to 
have been informed by an empiricist conception of dispositions. It may be that when a faulty empiricism 
is set aside, “dispositions” and “powers” can be taken to be more or less equivalent; but then it must be 
allowed that there are passive as well as active powers. It seems impossible to find a terminology on which 
all will agree. I say “potentiality” hoping to convey an idea of what a neo-Aristotelian might mean both by 
“power” and by “liability”).
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powers to tell us what kinds of processes the object can engage in, so that 
they connect our understanding of causality with our recognition of the dis-
play of the potentialities of things by the things having those potentialities. 
Thus they defend a metaphysics in which a substance ontology belongs, and 
to which such notions as powers, capacities, liabilities are central. They have 
no problem treating examples such as I have considered. Objects may be such 
as to act upon things because of powerful properties they have, and they may 
be such as to be acted on by things because of liabilities they have. So, for 
instance: one who pushes a cart exercises its power to act on another thing a 
liability of which is manifest so long as it is being pushed. Causality, then, is 
present in the world inasmuch as something is actually exercising its powers, 
perhaps affecting something else in doing so. When an agent is the subject of 
a causal verb, the agent is (or was) engaged in a causal process by virtue of ex-
ercising (or having exercised) a power it has. Such an agent could be a person, 
an animal of another sort, or a mere object.
The neo-Aristotelian literature that has accrued in the last twelve or so 
years9 reveals that the understanding of causality as we first know it is out of 
line with the understanding of any relation of cause having a place in scien-
tific theory or in the principles of the physicalists. Earlier, but still recent, work 
abjures a Humean treatment of causality and accommodates a neo-Aristote-
lian view of it.10 If I have here drawn attention specifically to work that can be 
9  The literature I have in mind starts perhaps with Molnar (2003), afforced by Heil (2003). Many of the 
essays in Kistler and Ganassounou eds. (2007), in Marmodoro ed. (2009), and in Greco and Groff eds. 
(2012), and some of the essays in Groff ed. (2008) and in Tahko ed. (2012) enquire into one or another 
aspect of what I’m calling a neo-Aristotelian view. Lowe (2013) is good for a quick and careful introduction 
to the basics of a neo-Aristotelian view. (Mumford and Anjum (2011) might be thought to belong on this 
list. But although their position is avowedly anti-Humean, I take their claim that “causation is a relation 
between property instances” to put them outside the neo-Aristotelian camp). It should be said thaton many 
issuesthere is far from perfect agreement among these various writers. And I should especially note that 
I would myself resist Lowe’s conception of laws as both regulating movements and as “merely descriptive 
of the domain of non-normative facts”, so that I don’t see eye to eye with him on the matter of specifically 
rational agency. Compare also Jacobs and O’Connor (2013). Evidently there is room for debate about ra-
tional powers in neo-Aristotelian metaphysics (but not room here).
10 Three good women should be mentioned. 1. G.E.M. Anscombe put paid to the empiricist ortho-
doxy of Humeans in her (1971) where she drew attention to the fact that there is an understanding of 
causality which is parasitic on an understanding of verbs of action. 2. Nancy Cartwright’s work over 
the years has drawn attention to the multi-faceted nature of causality: see e.g. Cartwright (2004). 
3. Helen Steward shares a sort of causal pluralism with Cartwright: she has long argued that: «The 
idea that there is some completely determinate ‘web’ of causal factors waiting to be extracted from 
our everyday explanations of particular effects is a myth, based on the idea that every such explana-
tion works by adverting somehow to a causally efficacious particular» (Cartwright, 1997, p. 40). 
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brought under the neo-Aristotelian head, then that is because it so obviously 
has something to say about agency, examples of which the problematizers and 
the physicalists treat as examples of “mental causation”. Yet none of this work 
appears to have made any impression upon work in mainstream philosophy of 
mind.11 (In philosophy of action, by contrast, there is now plenty of literature — 
much of it taking inspiration from, Anscombe (1957) — which rejects Humean-
ism and illuminates human agential phenomena without problematizing them. 
But this work has been ignored when action is a topic in philosophy of mind 
where questions about the truth of physicalism are at issue).
4. Causation by the Mental?
In order to bring out the point of thinking about agency in general, let me 
return to the boulder that f lattened a barn and the person who f lattened some 
dough. I hope that it might now be allowed that in both cases, so long as f lat-
tening was ongoing, the presence of causality is not accounted for by advert-
ing to a relation of causation obtaining between two items. In §2, I imagined 
someone responding to the suggestion that boulders and people are “physi-
cal” in some same sense by saying that a person’s body is what acts, and that 
one must look to the antecedents of the body’s movements in a treatment of 
mental→physical causation. The thought behind this response is that a body’s 
movement needs a cause. So what I now imagine someone saying is that just as 
something must have set the boulder in motion if it f lattened the barn, likewise 
something must have set a person in motion if she f lattened the dough. Well, I 
shall argue that a person is not a sort of thing that is sporadically set in motion 
by an efficient cause.
Of course mental vocabulary has a place in an account of how it came to be 
that the person flattened the dough and no immediate place in an account of 
how it came to be that the boulder flattened the barn. What many say is that the 
language of the mental gets in the former case because it describes the mental 
states of a person which cause her action. Human actions, these people say, are 
caused by beliefs and desires, or by intentions, or by decisions. For instance, it 
is said that your wanting to hail a taxi caused the movement of your arm (Papi-
This is a myth I try to counter in one of its aspects in §4.
11 In her Introduction to her edited (2008), Groff says, about what she aptly calls a revitalized notion of 
causality, that it has particular relevance to philosophers of social science; but there is no suggestion that 
there might yet be new life in philosophy of mind.
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neau, 2013). And it is said that «a decision to turn on the light caused Gus to 
move his finger thereby flipping the light switch» (Robb and Heil, 2014). Such 
things indeed are often said by philosophers, and even more often they are as-
sumed. But it is possible to disagree. Certainly you might have wanted to hail 
a taxi and have moved your arm in order to do so. But why should we think 
that this is a matter of there being a brain state which made your arm move?12 
Again, it could perfectly well have been that Gus would not have moved his fin-
ger thereby flipping the light switch unless he had decided to turn on the light. 
But why should we think that Gus was caused to move his finger by his deci-
sion? «Nothing caused me to move my finger», Gus might say, «it was getting a 
bit dark, and I decided to turn the light on».
The oft-made assumption that a movement of a part of a human body is the 
effect of one or more mental states derives, I think, from the causal theory of 
action, according to which actions are events caused by mental states. (No 
need for details here!). Many suppose that such a theory is established once 
it is recognized that a person may have done something she meant to because 
she thought such-and-such and wanted so-and-so; and then, on the strength 
of the fact that this because implicates causality, they assume that beliefs and 
desires stand to actions as causes to effects (with decisions or intentions maybe 
intervening).13 An example will help to bring out what is problematic about the 
assumption. So suppose that Ann has just now flattened the dough. Perhaps she 
has done so because she wanted flattened dough. More illuminating, however, 
and explanatory in turn of her wanting that, would be the fact that Ann is in 
the process of making bread: she has to flatten the dough at certain stages in 
12 When Papineau says «We can understand ‘wanting to hail a taxi’ as referring to the specific brain state 
that makes the relevant subject’s arm move» (2013, p. 148), he seems to me to come close to presupposing 
the sort of physicalism for which he means to be arguing. My thought in note 2 (supra) was that Papineau’s 
levels physicalism needed a disputable ontological assumption. I take his supposing that an explanation 
why someone did something might be recast as a claim about what a specific brain state “made happen” to 
be evidence that Papineau is indeed in need of the disputable assumption.
13 The story derives from Davidson (1963). There the claim that reason-explanation is causal comes to be 
“reformulated” as saying that “reasons cause actions”. For an argument against any such “reformulation” 
(an argument which didn’t trade on anything Aristotelian), see Hornsby (1999). Vicente once credited 
me with «the idea that causal relations have events as relata, while causal explanations can be relations 
between states» (Vicente, 2002, pp. 87–88). This has never been an idea of mine. I think — as Vicente says 
I do — that if believing that p is a state, then it is a state a whole person might be said to be in; but I deny that 
such facts as mention of it might be used to explain are things to which it stands in a relation. So I would 
deny that when I distinguished between causation and causal explanation, I «introduced an unnecessary 
complication in the argument». I do, however, think that causal chains had a more prominent part than they 
should have in the work of mine that Vicente criticized. Vicente responded to some of Hornsby (1997).
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the process. I do not know how many actions a causal theorist might want to 
say there would come to have been between the time at which Ann started to 
make bread (finding the first of the various ingredients she assembled) and the 
time when she will finish doing so (she will take a baked loaf out of the oven if 
all goes well). But whatever the number might be supposed to be, one won’t be 
apt to think that each has its very own cause, in the shape of a belief and desire 
which conspire somehow to trigger it. One can hardly isolate a f lattening of the 
dough, and think that one knows just what caused just it.
When a person’s actions are treated by the causal theory, as effects of men-
tal states, it seems that we might as well think of the occurrence of any of them 
as a matter of the agent’s ceasing to be idle. It is as if we could picture any piece 
of agency — hailing a taxi, turning on the light — as an interruption in a state 
of abeyance: now this belief and desire cause an action, next this other belief 
and desire cause another one … . This might not be a very inaccurate picture of 
boulders: they lie around, and from time to time they may be subjected to one 
or another force or come to be in contact with one or another object. But it is 
not a realistic picture of a human agent who may have many projects on the go at 
any time, and whose individual bodily movements (however these might be sup-
posed to be individuated) cannot be explained one at a time. When she is doing 
anything, thanks to her capacity to do it, there will be explanations of what 
she is doing which show her as having a reason to be doing it. She is a rational 
creature, leading a life, equipped with powers of thought and self-movement.
Let it be clear then that boulders don’t have very much in common with hu-
man beings! If I have brought boulders (and the like) into the argument that 
is because macroscopic mere objects and human beings do have it in common 
that they have capacities whose exercises are causal processes. Allowing that 
they have that much in common, one must account for the differences between 
them not by appeal to different sorts of triggers for their respective actions, 
but by appeal to differences between inanimate things and rational beings who 
lead a life.14 The causal theory of action not only misconstrues the role of men-
tal states in taking them to be causes of actions, it also, and correlatively, fails 
to recognize that human beings are capable of moving.
And there is another reason to pay attention to the fact that macroscopic 
mere objects and human beings alike have capacities to act. An understand-
14 I’m aware that here and elsewhere there is a signal absence of mention of non-human animals. I cannot 
go into questions about how rational animals differ from non-human animals (who of course for their own 
part lead lives); cp. note 9 supra.
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ing of the nature of non-human agency has a bearing on an understanding of 
the human case. Human beings inhabit, learn about, and act within, the causal 
nexus of the macrophysical objects admitted in neo-Aristotelian metaphysics. 
In participating in agency ourselves, we rely on our knowledge of the proper-
ties of the objects upon which we may act; and we draw upon such knowledge in 
acting. Consider, for the sake of having an example, the knowledge that might 
be at the service of someone who has the opportunity to lift a book she wishes 
to read from the shelf above her. If she takes the book down from the shelf, then 
a capacities-based understanding of causality enters into explanations not only 
of what rendered her capable of taking the book from the shelf — she knew how 
to get it down, but also of how the book came to be in her hands — it was liftable 
down from the shelf. The concepts that enter the knowledge a person uses in 
acting are ones that she employs in learning how things are, knowing how they 
may come to be, and knowing how to make a difference to how they are. Thus 
the kind of causality involved in the goings on of objects about which a person 
can know could hardly be different from the kind of causality that a person’s 
actions involve. Still the capacities of inanimate things and persons are as dif-
ferent as can be, with a person’s capacities consisting in the knowledge of some-
one who has lived and is living in a world containing things her knowledge of 
which may inform what she is doing at any moment.
5. Conclusion
«The problem of mental causation» has come to be thought of as a problem 
about causation by «the mental». My suggestion has been that whatever “causa-
tion by the mental” might be supposed to mean, it is not a matter of cause-effect 
relations between mental things and physical things. Indeed my main point has 
been that causality at large as we understand it does not consist simply in cause-
effect relations. Thus have I attempted to show why the principles about causa-
tion employed by problematizers and physicalists fail to make contact with any 
ordinary truths about ourselves as minded beings. I take philosophers of physi-
calist persuasion to be engaged in a vain attempt to reframe ordinary truths 
about ourselves by making use of some falsifying assumptions both about the 
scope of the physical, and about the nature of causality.
I have not given arguments for the neo-Aristotelians’ account of a powers-
based species of causality (still less said anything about its roots in Aristotle). 
But I have tried to show how such an account can accommodate ordinary truths 
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about something that is doing (or has done) something or other (and perhaps is 
doing [or has done] it to something or other). 
Nor have I attempted to give an account of human agency. But I hope to have 
said enough to suggest that any correct account of it might give the physicalist 
reason to pause, even if only to ask what it is for a person to be in the process of 
doing something that she means to be doing.
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